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French thinker Pierre Hadot is famous for his claim that ancient philosophia was conceived in the Greek and 
Roman schools as a way of life, including existential or “spiritual” practices (such as forms of meditation, 
memorisation, bodily exercises and privations) to reshape students’ beliefs, desires, and actions.1  The vision 
of philosophy that emerges from his work is strikingly at odds with most contemporary conceptions and insti-
tutional practices, although it has won a wide audience both within the academy (in some measure via the later 
Foucault’s avowed debt to Hadot) and amongst a more general readership.  ‘Today’, Hadot can quote Thoreau, 
‘there are professors of philosophy, but no philosophers’2: the principal products of contemporary philosophy 
are not philosophical men and women, but theoretical papers and monographs.’
Hadot’s vision of the Hellenistic philosophers which were his principal focus after 1970 (especially the Stoics) 
is also markedly different than what one Ànds in leading angloamerican commentators on the philosophy of 
this period, such as Inwood, Striker, Annas, Engberg-Pedersen, Nussbaum, Long, and Cooper.3  Hadot contends 
that texts like Marcus Aurelius’ Meditations or Epictetus’ Encheiridion can only be critically comprehended as 
documents in the Stoic philosophy being ‘applied’, repetitively formulated, varied, and enjoined by an author 
eis Heauton or to beginners (ta prokoptonta), with a view to their ethical reformation.4  They are not, as we 
might otherwise suppose, attempts to construct an original theoretical system for its own sake, or for a general 
audience, on the model of academic philosophical writing today.  Hadot’s striking claim that the cultivation of a 
heightened philosophical attention (prosochē) to the living present and the greater whole of nature (physis) lay 
at the heart of both ancient Epicureanism and Stoic philosophy Ànds no near parallels in contemporary analytic 
interpretations of these schools.  Hadot’s work has indeed attracted criticism from several leading representa-
tives of that tradition for falsely conÁating philosophy with ‘religion,’ undervaluing the speciÀc role of rational 
argument and theoretical construction, and projecting a determinately neoplatonic metaphilosophy back across 
the other ancient schools.5
TO NOT FORGET: PIERRE HADOT’S LAST BOOK ON GOETHE.
PIERRE HADOT, N’OUBLIE PAS DE VIVRE: GOETHE ET LA 
TRADITION DES EXERCISES SPIRITUELS 
(ALBIN MICHEL, 2008)
Matthew Sharpe
Yet Hadot’s last book, completed in 2008 and so just two years before his passing, was not on the ancient or 
Hellenistic philosophers he so loved.  The work takes as its subject the modern poet, novelist, scientist, states-
man and philosopher Johann Wolfgang von Goethe.  Dedicated to his grandson and “haunted” by reÁection on 
his own imminent mortality6, Hadot’s 2008 study N’Oublie pas de vivre: Goethe et la tradition des exercise 
spirituels is a deeply sympathetic and beautiful book. Written in Hadot’s characteristically limpid prose, it 
represents both a novel intervention in scholarship on Goethe, and a revealing insight into Hadot’s distinct 
metaphilosophy and weltanschauung.  The book’s long third chapter on Goethe’s enigmatic “Orphic” poem 
Urworte underscores what the gentle sufÀciency of Hadot’s prose can make his readers pass over7: the way that 
his untimely classical style, far from reÁecting any shallowness of reÁection, was underwritten by the author’s 
extraordinary erudition, spanning across ancient philosophy, literature, and the West’s mystical, hermetic and 
esoteric traditions. (169-181, 215-220)  
N’Oublie pas de vivre: Goethe et la tradition des exercises spirituels, which has remained untranslated, has 
hitherto attracted little scholarly recognition or critical notice, even in its native French.  It is this situation that 
this review essay hopes to redress, in the small way permitted to any such piece of writing.  In what follows, 
we examine in turn Hadot’s framing claims concerning the shaping ends and origins of Goethe’s species of 
neoclassicism (Part I), his claims concerning Goethe’s debt to the classical or Hellenistic tradition of spiritual 
exercises (Part II), before our closing remarks (Part III) challenge some of Hadot’s claims concerning the 
author of Faust, and then reÁect on the signiÀcance of the fact that this last philosophical testament of Pierre 
Hadot’s was on a modern novelist, scientist, and poet, not an ancient philosopher.
I. ORIGINS, ENDS, FOUNDATIONS
Hadot takes the title of N’Oublie Pas de Vivre from Goethe’s characteristic, brief poem of 1826:
One knows of the memento mori
I love best to not resay
Why I must in the Áight of life
Torture you with the limit!
This is why, an aging barbarian Docendo,
I recommend to you
My dear friend, according to the manner which is yours
No more than vivere memento! (Goethe at 11, 147)
ReÁecting this poetic counsel, N’Oublie pas de vivre’s culminating fourth chapter is given over to expounding 
what for Hadot represents the core of Goethe’s philosophical message.  This in Hadot’s eyes is a full-blooded 
afÀrmation of this life and all it contains (“Le Oui à la vie et au monde”), as per the key poem “One and All”: 
Into the limitless to sink, 
No one, I trow, will ever blink, 
For there all sorrow we dismiss. 
Instead of cravings and wants untold, 
Fatiguing demands and duties cold, 
Surrender of one’s self is bliss. (Goethe at 249-250)
For Hadot, the overwhelming tonality of Goethe’s work is one of a conscious joy in being-there (freude am 
dasein/joie d’être-la (240-245)), captured well in Goethe’s comments to Schiller in a letter of June 1796:
Pleasure, joy, communion with things, it is that which is uniquely real, and all of what produces [true] 
reality.  All the rest is only vanity and deception. (Goethe at 244)
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The basis of this celebration of being-there, Hadot (like Karl Löwith8) stresses, lay in philosophical and aes-
thetic foundations which place Goethe in stark contrast to the historicism which was to emerge in Germany 
in the generations immediately following9.  For absolutely basic to all of Goethe’s work, Hadot argues, was a 
species of pantheistic naturalism: one which found voice alike in Goethe’s biological studies as in his novels 
and poetry—a remarkable conjunction Hadot examines in his previous work on natural philosophy, The Veil of 
Isis.10  Goethe’s species of pantheism, Hadot underscores, embraces a highly dynamic vision of nature, antici-
pating later lebensphilosophie, but observant of, and responsive to, a primordial register of physis beyond what 
humans, one passing part of the natural whole, typically evaluate as good and evil:
What we see of nature is force devouring force: nothing remains present, all passes, a million germs 
are destroyed at each instance, a million germs born ... beauty and ugliness, good and bad, all exist 
side by side with the same right. (Goethe at 248)  
Goethe’s joyous Oui to existence thus extends even to afÀrming the terrifying (au terriÀant/das Ungeheuer). 
The highest “sentiment of existing” for Hadot’s Goethe is thus—as it would later be for Schelling (253) and 
many of the later modern existentialists—a joy at once tinged with a certain “astonishment [saisissement]” or 
even angoisse before that which is “more profound than our selves” (sic.): an angoise with which his Faust 
identiÀes “the better part of man” (Goethe, Faust I, 6272-4), and Goethe the “primal experience” of life and 
being:
The immediate perception of originary phenomena plunges us into a sort of anguish … Before the 
originary phenomena, when, as they must, they appear to our senses, we feel a sort of fear which can 
pass into anguish … (255)  
The culminating section of N’Oublie pas de vivre hence sees Hadot highlighting the deep proximity of Goethe 
to his admirer, Friedrich Nietzsche.  (11, 256-267)  Unlike Nietzsche himself, and most other commentators11, 
Hadot has less than we might expect to say concerning Goethe’s well-known debts to Spinoza. (11; 48; 240; 
269)  More time is spent by Hadot on Goethe’s reading of the great German philologist Winckelmann’s inÁuen-
tial work on the Greeks. (34-5)  Some Àne pages are devoted to Goethe’s observations of classical ruins in his 
journey to Italy, and his captivation by representations of ancient life in the mural art at Pompeii and Hercula-
neum (26-31; 38)—all of which Hadot positions as decisive in moving Goethe away from the Sturm und Drang 
of The Young Werther to that mature position the “sage of Weimar” would later express in his conversations 
with Eckermann: “the classical is what I call the healthy; and the romantic the sickly…” (cf. 22-3; 25)
Indeed, while Hadot situates Goethe within a lineage of modern pantheistic philosophical naturalist thinking, 
his more idiosyncratic claim in the book is to resituate Goethe as what we might almost call an “ancient”: the 
worthy legatee of a much older Greek heritage of thought.   As his subtitle, Goethe et la tradition des exercises 
spirituels Áags, however, this heritage is not that of the Greeks as envisaged in the idealisations of Winckel-
mann and Schiller, those untroubled lovers of natural beauty and mesure (33-36). (We do note, though, that 
his commentary in N’Oublie pas de vivre on Goethe’s celebration of ancient art’s ability to capture the eigen-
blick evoke this kind of romantic philhellenism closely enough that Hadot feels the need to distantiate Goethe 
from it. (36-38))12  The Hellenic (and Hellenistic) heritage Hadot wants to situate Goethe within is rather that 
which Hadot’s earlier work, principally Philosophy as a Way of Life, has uncovered.  This is a heritage from 
the philosophical Greeks; albeit one in which philosophical discourse, and theoretical accounts of human and 
wider nature were coupled with speciÀc argumentative, meditative, somatic and rhetorical practices aimed to so 
deeply impress the results of the schools’ theoretical inquiries upon the psychai of students that they reshaped 
their entire sense, and ways, of life.  If Goethe valorised and celebrated in the classical Greeks and Romans an 
elevated species of serenity, Hadot argues: “what Nietzsche saw well [is also true], … that this serenity was 
acquired and not primitive, resulting from an immense effort of will … above all, it existed in the ancient world 
in a philosophical will to Ànd such peace of the soul by the transformation of the self and its way of seeing the 
world.” (40)13
We turn now to Hadot’s claims concerning Goethe as conscious legatee of the ancient tradition of philosophi-
cal paideia or practice: a “voluntary, radical transformation of one’s way of living and looking at the world”14 
through existential or spiritual exercises.
II. THE SPIRITUAL EXERCISES IN GOETHE: ATTENTION TO THE PRESENT MO-
MENT AND THE VIEW FROM ABOVE
The Àrst half of N’Oublie pas de vivre, in two lengthy chapters, is devoted to uncovering in Goethe’s literary 
productions, autobiography, correspondences and conversations, key “spiritual exercises” Hadot contends lay 
at the heart of ancient philosophy, taking varying but deeply cognate forms in the different schools.
The Àrst of these exercises spirituels is a mindful attention to the present moment: “the only Goddess I adore,” 
as Hadot quotes Goethe in the title of his Àrst chapter. (15)  Despite all their differences, Hadot contends that 
there is a “grande analogie” in the ways both the Stoics and Epicureans enjoined in their adherents a reÀned 
attentiveness to the present moment, as a key component of eudemonia and characteristic of philosophical 
enlightenment. (42)15  In the words of Marcus Aurelius (the subject, beside Goethe, of Hadot’s only other 
book-length study16 on a single author after his early works on Plotinus,17 Porphyry and Victorinus18): “All the 
happiness you are seeking by such long, roundabout ways you can have right now … I mean, if you leave all 
of the past behind you, if you leave the future to providence, and if you arrange the present according to piety 
and justice.”19  From Exercises spirituels et philosophie antique (largely translated as Philosophy as a Way of 
Life20) and Hadot’s other texts, Hadot unpacks several chains of reÁection underscoring this high valuation of 
the present moment in Greek thought. N’Oublie pas de vivre concisely recounts these philosophical claims, 
tracing their logic through the extant Epicurean and Stoic texts:
• the recognition that the present alone, as against past and future is that tense in which we can act or 
suffer, and in which all our experiences, and all the things we can change within them, occur (as per 
Seneca’s advice to Lucilius: “Two things must be cut short: the fear of the future and the memory of 
past discomfort; [since] the one does not concern me anymore, and the other does not concern me 
yet.”21
• the recognition, which can be reanimated forcefully by memento mori (another key theme for 
philosophical meditation22), that the present is nevertheless passing and irretrievable, hence singular 
and precious, to be seized, sur-le-champ (as per the Epicurean Horace’s famous carpe diem! (42)23);
the reÁection that the present, just as it is, is what we celebrate and wish to recur when we are happy 
(this is the aspect Nietzsche later highlights);
• and the acknowledgment that these signiÀcances of the present (Goethe’s eigenblick or the Stoic 
kairos (27)) are nevertheless most often forgotten by us, so that we do ‘forget to live’: instead becom-
ing caught up in the mundane present (Goethe’s das Gemeine (24)): our attention lost in concerns 
for external goods, the objects of unnecessary desires, the consideration of future possibilities and 
anticipatory rehearsal of responses to them24, the opinions and concerns of others, and futile regrets 
or nostalgie concerning things past.
The key instance Hadot highlights of Goethe’s advocacy of such a heightened attention to the present moment 
comes from the extraordinary second book of Faust.  It is the moment when Faust, in whom Hadot sees the 
deÀnitively dynamic modern hero (16), glimpses a brief moment of happiness: almost long enough for him to 
wish for an instant to stop to say “stay a while, you are so beautiful”, and so lose his wager with Mephistoph-
eles.  Helen, the paradigmatic symbol of ancient beauty (22), has appeared to Faust.  Almost instantly, oneiri-
cally, the two fall in love.  Together then les amants begin to speak in rhyming lines, Faust at Àrst offering to 
teach Helen this modern conceit (cf. 21), she quickly coming to complete his lines as if out of his own mouth:
Faust—Not backwards, forwards is the spirit’s sight,  
This moment now, alone … 
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Helen—is our delight.25
It is a moment of such intensity that, as Hadot comments, time itself seems for the hero and heroine to stop (19), 
and neither is untouched by that kind of angoisse before the sheer “splendour of being” (22) we met above:
Helen—I feel so far away and yet so near, And gladly say now: ‘Here, I am! Here!’
Faust—I scarcely breathe, I tremble, speech is dead: This is a dream: time and place have Áed.
Helen—I seem exhausted, yet created new, Enmeshed with you, the unknown and the true.
Faust—Don’t seek to analyse so rare a fate!  Our duty is to live: though but for a day.26
This momentary exchange, that for Hadot so piquantly evokes the possibility of an elusive synthesis of ancient 
and modern, activity and contemplation (20-26), gives the title of one of Hadot’s essays in Exercises spirituels 
et philosophie antique.  In that essay as in N’Oublie pas de vivre, though, Hadot is able to cite ample instances 
of such a valorisation of the present instant in Goethe, notably in the Marienbad Elegy’s appeal to “with joyful 
wisdom / Look the instant in the eye! Do not delay!” (Hadot 1996, 231)  Also paradigmatic here for Hadot is 
Goethe’s tellingly titled “Rule Of Life” of 1815, which closely mirrors Seneca’s cited advice to Lucilius above:
If you would live unrufÁed by care -
Let not the past torment you e’er
Be angered as little as you can
And let the present be ever enjoyed;
Never let your heart be moved with hate,
And as for the future, conÀde it unto God. (Goethe at 231)
It is the same enigmatic advice Goethe was to give, late in his life, to Eckermann, directly echoing what Hadot 
takes to be the heart of the ancient philosophical exercises27: “Only persist in this, … hold fast by the present. 
Every situation—nay, every moment—is of inÀnite worth; for it is the representative of a whole eternity.”28 
Goethe, Hadot claims, “was in his way of living the present moment, … ‘half Stoic and half Epicurean.’  He 
enjoyed the present moment like an Epicurean, and willed it intensely like a Stoic.”29
Such advocacy of attention to, or enjoyment of, the present moment—which Hadot does not shrink from 
describing as verging on a “mystical dimension” in the Stoics30—raises many questions.  It can appear as an 
unphilosophical celebration of immediacy, as John M. Cooper31 has charged against Hadot—and the Neo-
Kantians charged of Goethe.  Nevertheless, as per Goethe’s cited advice to Eckermann, Hadot stresses that 
this ancient philosophical valuation of the present was the Áipside of a larger sense that the present moment, 
seen aright, “offers us the whole of reality”32: as in the Stoic Chrysippus’ enigmatic claim that “If a person has 
wisdom for one instant, he is no less happy than he who possesses it for an eternity”; and Epicureans’ similarly 
enigmatic claims concerning the pleasure that was for them the highest good, that “[a]n inÀnite period of time 
could not cause us more pleasure than can be derived from this one.”33 
These difÀcult thoughts open onto the theme of Hadot’s second chapter on Goethe and the legacy of ancient 
philosophical exercises.  This is Goethe’s recurrent use, in reÁections upon his own art and in his works them-
selves, of images of physical elevation and of looking down upon human affairs en haut, from above.  Once 
more, readers of Hadot’s better known works will be familiar with this “view from above” as a spiritual exer-
cise Hadot shows to have been advocated by Àgures like Seneca or Philo, practiced by Aurelius, and suggested 
in Plato’s Theaetetus, Timaeus and Republic.34  The view from above is an exercise in what Hadot, following 
the Stoics, calls lived physics (physique veçue).  In this exercise, the apparently wholly theoretical or con-
templative process of ascending philosophically from out of mundane opinions and concerns towards a more 
general understanding of the natural whole is advocated as a means to generate concrete but elevating ethical 
effects in practitioners.  As Hadot stresses again in N’Oublie pas de vivre, cultivating this “view from above” is 
directed in the ancient descriptions at generating two, complementary existential effects upon the person of the 
inquirer.  These are, Àrst, what Foucault under Hadot’s inÁuence calls a sense of “the irony of the miniscule”35. 
Seen from this new perspective, our everyday concerns, in which we have hitherto been caught up, are shown 
to be almost ant-like: less mountains than mole hills (as when Plato’s Socrates in the Theaetetus reports that the 
true philosopher, whose mind is “borne in all directions … studying the stars, and investigating the universal 
nature,” because of this considers all the usual political concerns of his fellows “petty and of no account”36). 
Secondly, and as a Áipside to this reÁective distancing of ourselves from our mundane selves, learning to philo-
sophically re-see our lives from this elevated perspective thus involves cultivating a kind of true or philosophi-
cal megalopsychia: “the epistēmē which makes one be above those things whose nature it is to happen to good 
and bad persons alike,” as the Stoics had redeÀned this aretē.37
These same senses of the view from above, Hadot claims in N’Oublie pas de vivre, are also in play at decisive 
moments in Goethe’s literary and poetic oeuvre.  As Hadot writes:
…. it is characteristic of the older Goethe to stage on high mountains the decisive moment of inner 
transformation of his heroes, where they detach themselves from their past, Ànally to rejoin in some 
way and to reorient themselves towards a new life … (119) 
Faust, devastated after Euphorion (his progeny by Helen)’s death in Faust II, is carried up on his beloved’s 
vestments “far above all that is vulgar, towards the highest ether”: and is thus able to surmount his sorrow, just 
as his recovery after Grechen’s death has been occasioned by the “joy” he senses in the living nature around 
him.  Wilhelm Meister, at the opening of the second volume of the Journeyman Years, is likewise placed by 
Goethe on a mountain peak looking down, before undertaking to remodel himself. The liberating release such 
“looking down” upon mundane concerns occasions, however, is in Goethe’s stagings, as in the ancient texts, 
the direct reverse of what Goethe presents as a profound re-connection with the larger whole.  Consider these 
extraordinary lines from “Granite”:
Seated on a bare summit, embracing in my regard a vast land, I can say to myself: ‘You rest here 
immediately on the rock which goes to the profoundest depths of the earth.  Nothing is interposed 
between me and the primitive world.’  In this instant, where the forces of attraction and of movement 
of the earth are exercised equally upon me, where the inÁuences of the sky encircle me most closely, 
I am opened to the highest considerations over nature …. Here on the most ancient altar, which is 
raised without any intermediary on what is most profound in creation, I offer a sacriÀce to the Being 
of beings: I touch the Àrst, the most solid beginnings of our existence, I look on high at the world, the 
abrupt valleys with their soft slopes, these fertile plains that I see in the distance. My soul is elevated 
above herself and above all, and it is Àlled with nostalgia for the sky which is so close to me ….
For Hadot’s Goethe ‘above all’, though, such an elevation operates not simply as a recurrent image of spiri-
tual transformation within his poetry and novels.  It operates also as an image of poetry and artistic creativ-
ity itself, and thereby of Goethe’s own existential calling. “The poet, as a bird, can hover above the world,” 
Goethe writes, and his Faust compares the human spirit itself to a skylark: “it is inborn in every man, that his 
spirit sours onwards and upwards.”38  In some fascinating passages, Hadot traces Goethe’s fascination with the 
MontgolÀer, the hot air balloon Àrst Áown in November 1783: which for Goethe in a letter to Schiller becomes 
an apt metaphor for the elevation he was just then experiencing reading Homer—as if he were himself one of 
Homer’s deities perched on Olympus looking down on the Àelds of Ilium below.39  “True poetry”, as Goethe 
reÁects likewise in his autobiography (signiÀcantly entitled Poetry and Truth):
… is recognised in the way that, like a profane gospel, it is capable of delivering us from the earthly 
weights that we accept, because it procures to us at the time an inner serenity and external pleasure. 
Like a hot air balloon, true poetry elevates us, with the ballast which is attached to us, into superior 
regions where, because of her, inextricable human labyrinths are unravelled under our regard, which 
sees them now from on high …40
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In Hadot’s characteristic language, that is, Goethe’s conception of poetry was deeply philosophical, not simply 
for the many philosophical themes Goethe undertook to write upon, but as itself a means of spiritual or existen-
tial transformation: “to elevate each above himself.” (Goethe at 266)41
III. CONCLUDING REMARKS
 
N’Oublie pas de vivre is arguably the most personal of Hadot’s works: one which he avows with characteristic 
candour is a work of love, based upon a lifelong process of returning to and savouring Goethe’s works. (9) The 
very fact that Goethe was pre-eminently a great poet and that Hadot is comfortable situating him in a legacy of 
great litterateurs (pre-eminently Lucian and Voltaire) who, in his eyes, carried forward the ancient philosophi-
cal exercises as institutional philosophy devolved over Western history into “theory alone” reÁects what is a 
distinct signature of Hadot’s meta-philosophy.  Hadot has long challenged any simple, hard and fast division 
between philosophy and literature, based on his sense of philosophy as a practice, and its shared concern with 
the literary arts always “to produce an effect, a habitus within the soul, or to provoke a transformation of the 
self of [their] addressee[s].”42  The focus on this-worldly life-afÀrmation (“the happiness and duty of existing 
in the cosmos”43) which Hadot celebrates in Goethe, cultivated through the two exercises of attention to the 
present moment and its demands, and assuming a reÁective “view from above,” undoubtedly reÁect the sub-
stantive core of Hadot’s untimely image of philosophy as an existentially serious business: “ il ne s’agit pas de 
s’informer, mais de se former”. (10)  Hadot’s own writing in N’Oublie pas de vivre, Ànally, brings together, in 
a characteristic coincidence of opposites, Hadot’s classical restraint and encyclopaedic learning with the quiet, 
insistent afÀrmation of real existential commitment underlying his authorship.  For the Hadot of 2008, as much 
as in any of his previous works, the ideas he seeks and Ànds in Goethe concerning how to live, even in the sure 
knowledge of death’s immanence, matter existentially: not descriptions of ways of life only, they are also chal-
lenges and calls to self-transformation.
In the brief space available here, let me state two of the many questions Pierre Hadot’s last book may suggest 
for its reader. 
First, from the side of assessing the meaning and force of Pierre Hadot’s Goethe: a critical reader might ask 
whether Hadot’s attempt to situate Goethe as a legatee of Greek philosophical bios and the exercises spirituels 
does not, for all its insight, also blinker us from weighing aright the ways in which Goethe—the man and, as 
it were, the “human dynamo”—was in some ways deÀnitively modern: more Faust than Helen or Hellenistic; 
and a dedicatee of world-transformation, rather than the serene world-contemplation of the Hellenistic sophoi. 
There is no question that Goethe’s deÀnitive hero, Faust, begins as a good model for appreciating the Hadotian-
vision of philosophy.  This disgruntled scholar’s restless quest for life comes out of the same kind of ennui with 
academic studies that attracts many scholars today to Hadot’s work:
I’ve studied now Philosophy  
And Jurisprudence, Medicine,— 
And even, alas! Theology,—
From end to end, with labour keen;  
And here, poor fool! with all my lore  
I stand, no wiser than before … 
That which one does not know, one needs to use; 
And what one knows, one uses never.44
Yet, if we are to take Faust as Goethe’s crowning or emblematic work, as Hadot seems at times comfortable 
with doing, it is unclear whether Goethe’s hero ever overcomes that restless dynamism that sees him “storm 
through life,” as he reÁects45: “every moment … unsatisÀed.”46  Nor, short of his Ànal otherworldly beatiÀca-
tion, is it wholly clear that Faust achieves any kind of meaningful spiritual tranquilitas or ataraxia in this life, 
or ability to look the present moment in the face: the goal of the Hellenistic schools central to Hadot’s later 
work. Throughout the poem’s two books, this veritable force of nature “desires, achieves my course, desires 
again, and so, with force …”47 until we Ànally see him sighting fulÀlment in a project that for the Greeks would 
surely have seemed deÀnitively hybristic: that of trying to subdue the seas, à la the Persian King at Salamis.48 
It is true that, elevated by the voyage en haut after Euphorion and Helen depart, Faust does at least begin to 
place his titanism at the service of others.  It is Faust’s envisaging of a “free earth: where a free race, in free-
dom, stand” that delivers Faust “the developer”49 his “highest moment” and mortal rest with the ability to at last 
say to the present moment: “‘Stay a while! You are so lovely!’50  Yet the Ànal scenes of the epic are famously 
enigmatic, beginning with Faust’s responsibility for the forcible relocation—like some perverse Zeus—of the 
elderly, defenceless Baucis and Philemon in the name of his new utopia; continuing through Faust’s “last and 
greatest act of will”51 in the creation of “a Paradise /Whose boundaries hold back the raging tide”52; to his 
death, transÀguration and beatiÀc vision as Doctor Marianus.  Even as Faust contemplates the new paradise for 
“many millions” he foresees, he avows that “[t]he last word wisdom ever has to say” is that “[h]e only earns his 
freedom and existence, who’s forced to win them freshly every day.”
Just so, the sage of Weimar’s classicism so ably brought out by Hadot formed but one component of that intense 
spiritual dynamism that saw Goethe himself produce novels, poems, dramas, over 3000 sketches, scientiÀc 
works, an autobiography, and over 10,000 letters (written up until the very week of his death).  Hadot is forced 
to confront Goethe’s distinctive modernity in his long chapter on the poem Urworte, which ends by appealing 
to hope (elpis), in contrast to the well-known ancient cautions concerning the last thing out of the Hesiodic 
Pandora’s box.  Hadot tries, via recourse to Goethe’s pantheism, to interpret the poem in a way consistent with 
the kind of immanent world-afÀrmation he sees in the Hellenistic philosophies:   
… Hope in Primal Words [is] a power which, in turning us towards what is elevated, permits us to 
reinterpret the destiny which is imposed on us and to act with conÀdence by situating our action 
within the perspective of the All and the will of God-Nature.  Hope is inherent to life and to action. 
To hope, it is to be in life, it is to be active …” (236) 
Yet it is difÀcult, even for Hadot, to square Goethe’s stated conviction late in his life “… of our survival 
[beyond death] coming from the concept of activity”—viz.: “If, until my end, I act without an instant of rest, 
nature is obliged to assign me another form of existence …” (235)—with the philosophical dogmata of any of 
the ancient schools.  For all of Goethe’s criticisms of Francis Bacon, this ethical activism indeed stands much 
closer to Bacon’s inÁuential criticism of the ancient ethical philosophers in The Advancement of Learning as 
privileging the contemplative over active lives, and private contemplative perfection over charitable, dynamic 
devotion to the public good.53
To criticise Hadot’s rendition of Goethe, however, seems peevish given the many riches, and the unique intel-
lectual perspective, N’Oublie pas de vivre brings to the study of the sage of Weimar.  Our closing thoughts here 
then will concern Hadot’s oeuvre as a whole, and the particular light this last, lesser-known book on Goethe 
retrospectively casts back on his better-known studies.  
By far the predominant anxiety expressed by Anglo-American critics of Hadot’s work concerns the way that his 
emphasis on philosophy as cultivating an ongoing state of attention or awareness can be seen to sit in tension 
with rigorous argumentation and the dispassionate concern for truth.  N’Oublie pas de vivre will do nothing 
to allay those academic anxieties about Hadot’s work: arraigning Goethe, a self-professed poet, as a principal 
modern legatee of classical philosophy, if anything highlights the methodological and substantive distance be-
tween his work and predominant, analytic later modern readings of classical and Hellenistic philosophy.  While 
Hadot’s published work turned increasingly to the Hellenistic schools after 1970, the Compte rendus of his 
courses at the École Pratique des Hautes Etudes54, and three late commentaries on Plotinus’ Enneads (Traités 
9, 38, and 5055), shows Hadot’s continuing interest in Western mysticism.  It also invites the supposition56 that 
his early experiences and encounter with Plotinus overwhelmingly shaped his wider sense of philosophia, as 
well as his particular sensitivities in reading Goethe. (251)
TO NOT FORGET: PIERRE HADOT’S LAST BOOK ON GOETHE MATTHEW SHARPE
A more provocative consideration prompted by N’Oublie pas de vivre, as it seems to me, concerns the sig-
niÀcance of Hadot choosing to write his last monograph not on the ancient thought whose study had made 
his name, but on the modern personage of Goethe.  In What is Ancient Philosophy? in particular, the status 
of modern philosophy in Hadot’s picture is left tellingly underdeveloped: on the one hand, modern purely 
theoretical philosophical discourse carries forward the subordination of philosophia of the Christian era into 
modernity; while on the other, Hadot brieÁy invokes a series of Àgures, from Montaigne to Kant, Thoreau, and 
Wittgenstein, who he argues have remained aware of, or practiced, varieties of philosophising as a way of life. 
N’Oublie pas de vivre’s work on Goethe clearly serves in part to Àll this lacuna in Hadot’s historical narra-
tive, and to show the kind of rereading of modern thinkers opened up for readers by Hadot’s methodology and 
metaphilosophy.  Yet, as his last philosophical testament, this book on Goethe casts a revealing, indirect light 
on Hadot’s own, seemingly wholly antiquarian, “return to the ancients.”  Hadot has been remarkably forthcom-
ing in interviews concerning his intellectual development.  In that development, he assigns central, formative 
places to the moderns Montaigne, Nietzsche, Kierkegaard, Wittgenstein, Goethe and Heidegger.  Certainly, 
then, when we turn back via N’Oublie pas de vivre to the earlier works, one is struck by just how central Goethe 
in particular has been in his work: particularly in shaping his key essays in Philosophy as a Way of Life on the 
exercises of attention to the present moment and the view from above.57
The placing of N’Oublie pas de vivre as Hadot’s effective, last philosophical testament then inescapably raises, 
on one hand, the question of the inÁuence of the modern philosophical visions Hadot was surrounded with, 
as a student in the 20th century, and his vision of ancient philosophy.  At the deepest level, though, Hadot’s 
choice to write his Ànal work on Goethe’s living debt to ancient thought and arts of living can I think be seen 
as emblematic of a much more important register of Hadot’s lifework.  This was Hadot’s desire not so much to 
rearticulate, in either elegiac or celebratory mode, any absolute “ancient-modern” opposition.  Hadot’s work, 
it seems to me, stands as its own distinct kind of challenge to the historicist suppositions that usually underlie 
such “philosophies of history” altogether.58  Hadot’s own way of writing for its part attests that as well as “mak-
ing people love old truths”, as he once described his goal59, his larger ambition was to in effect short-circuit the 
idea that ancient truths are of interest only to antiquarians.  Through sympathetically showing how these old 
truths speak to continuing human needs and interests, these books aim to inspire new generations of modern 
readers: as he once described this “indirect communication,” “allowing [sic.] a call to be heard that the reader 
has the freedom to accept or refuse.”60  It is in such a remarkable invitation to new generations to “take up, from 
scratch, the task of learning to read and to re-read these ‘old truths’” (“for their meaning to be understood, these 
truths must be lived, and constantly re-experienced”61) that Hadot’s own Lynceus-like62 task, elpis and “highest 
moment” surely lay.  N’Oublie pas de vivre: Goethe et la tradition des exercises spirituels, which closes with 
its own veritable hymn to a joie de vie that is as much Hadotian as Goethian (273), is a Àtting last call in this 
lifework: not a ‘call for papers’, but for new philosophers.
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